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Abstract. The foreseen growing role of outsourced machine learning services is raising concerns about
the privacy of user data. Several technical solutions are being proposed to address the issue. Hardware
security modules in cloud data centres appear limited to enterprise customers due to their complexity,
while general multi-party computation techniques require a large number of message exchanges. This
paper proposes a variety of protocols for privacy-preserving regression and classification that (i) only
require additively homomorphic encryption algorithms, (ii) limit interactions to a mere request and
response, and (iii) that can be used directly for important machine-learning algorithms such as logistic
regression and SVM classification. The basic protocols are then extended and applied to feed-forward
neural networks.
Keywords: Machine learning as a service · Linear regression · Logistic regression · Support vector
machines · Feed-forward neural networks · Data privacy · Additively homomorphic encryption
1 Introduction
The popularity and hype around machine learning, combined with the explosive growth of user-generated
data, is pushing the development of machine learning as a service (MLaaS). A typical application scenario
of MLaaS is shown in Fig. 1. It involves a client sending data to a service provider (server) owning and
running a trained machine learning model for a given task (e.g., medical diagnosis). Both the input data and
the model should be kept private: for obvious privacy reasons on the client’s side and to protect intellectual
property on the server’s side.
Client Server
Input data: x Model: θ
x−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
yˆ = hθ(x)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 1: A server offering MLaaS owns a model defined by its parameters θ. A client needs the prediction
hθ(x) of this model for a new input data x. This prediction is a function of the model and of the data.
In this paper we look at various protocols allowing the realisation of such scenario in a minimum number
of message exchanges between both parties. Our assumption is that both the client and the server are honest
? This is an extended version of [19].
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but curious, that is, they both follow the protocol but may record information all along with the aim,
respectively, to learn the model and to breach the client’s privacy. Our design is guided by the following ideal
requirements, in decreasing importance:
1. Input confidentiality—The server does not learn anything about the input data x provided by the
client;
2. Output confidentiality—The server does not learn the outcome yˆ of the calculation;
3. Minimal model leakage—The client does not learn any other information about the model beyond
what is revealed by the successive outputs.
With respect to the issue of model leakage, it is noted that the client gets access to the outcome, i.e., the
value of hθ(x), which may leak information about θ, violating Requirement 3. This is unavoidable and not
considered as an attack within our framework. Possible countermeasures to limit the leakage on the model
include rounding the output or adding some noise to it [29].
Related Work Earliest works for private machine learning evaluation [3,23] were concerned with training
models in a privacy-preserving manner. More recent implementations for linear regression, logistic regression,
as well as neural networks are offered by SecureML [25]. The case of support vector machines (SVM) is, for
example, covered in [32]. On the contrary, this paper deals with the problem of privately evaluating a linear
machine-learning model, including linear/logistic regression and SVM classification. In [7], Bos et al. suggest
to evaluate a logistic regression model by replacing the sigmoid function with its Taylor series expansion. They
then apply fully homomorphic encryption so as to get the output result through a series of multiplications
and additions over encrypted data. They observe that using terms up to degree 7 the Taylor expansion
gives roughly two digits of accuracy to the right decimal. Kim et al. [21] argue that such an expansion does
not provide enough accuracy on real-world data sets and propose another polynomial approximation. For
SVM classification, Zhang et al. [32, Protocol 2] propose to return an encryption of the raw output. The
client decrypts it and applies the discriminating function to obtain the corresponding class. Unfortunately,
this leaks more information than necessary on the model. A similar path is taken by Barni et al. in [6] for
feed-forward neural networks. Extracting the model (even partially) is nevertheless more difficult in their
case because of the inherent complexity of the model. Moreover, to further obfuscate it (and thereby limit
the potential leakage), the authors suggest to randomly permute computing units (neurons) sharing the same
activation function or to add dummy ones. For classification, the approach put forward by Bost et al. [8] is
closest to ours. They construct three classification protocols fulfilling our design criteria (Requirements 1–
3): hyperplane decision, na¨ıve Bayes, and decision trees. An approach orthogonal to ours that introduces
privacy in regression or classification is differential privacy [11]. Crucially, it can be combined with secure
computation, in our case by incorporating noise in the input vectors or in the model parameters. Differential
privacy can thus be used to enhance the privacy properties of our protocols.
Our Contributions Our paper follows the line of work by Bost et al., making use only of additively homo-
morphic encryption (i.e., homomorphic encryption supporting additions). We devise new privacy-preserving
protocols for a variety of important prediction tasks. The protocols we propose either improve on [8] or ad-
dress machine-learning models not covered in [8]. In particular, we aim at minimising the number of message
exchanges to a mere request and response. This is important when latency is critical. An application of [8,
Protocol 4] to binary SVM classification adds a round-trip to the comparison protocol whereas our imple-
mentation optimally only needs a single round-trip, all included. Likewise, a single round-trip is needed in
our private logistic regression protocol, as in [7,32]. But contrary to [7,32], the resulting prediction is exact in
our case (i.e., there is no loss of accuracy) and does not require the power of fully homomorphic encryption.
With respect to neural networks, we adapt our protocols to binarised networks and to networks relying of
the popular ReLU activation; see Section 4.2. As far as we know, this results in the first privacy-preserving
implementation of the non-linear ReLU function from additively homomorphic encryption.
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Organisation The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a short summary of
important machine learning techniques for which we will propose secure protocols. We also recall crypto-
graphic tools on which we will build out protocols. In Section 3, we propose three families of protocols for
private inference. They do not depend on a particular additively homomorphic encryption scheme. We next
apply in Section 4 our protocols to the private evaluation of neural networks. Finally, the paper concludes
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
This section reviews some important machine learning models, which all rely on the computation of an
inner product. It also introduces building blocks that are necessary in the subsequent design of our privacy-
preserving protocols.
2.1 Linear Models and Beyond
Owing to their simplicity, linear models (see, e.g., [2, Chapter 3] or [17, Chapters 3 and 4]) should not be
overlooked: They are powerful tools for a variety of machine learning tasks and find numerous applications.
Problem Setup In a nutshell, machine learning works as follows. Each particular problem instance is
characterised by a set of d features which may be viewed as a vector (x1, . . . , xd)
ᵀ
of Rd. For practical
reasons, a fixed coordinate x0 = 1 is added. We let X ⊆ {1} × Rd denote the input space and Y the
output space. Integer d is called the dimensionality of the input data.
There are two phases:
– The learning phase consists in approximating a target function f : X → Y from D = {(xi, yi) ∈ X ×Y |
yi = f(xi)
}
16i6n, a training set of n pairs of elements. Note that the target function can be noisy. The
output of the learning phase is a function hθ : X → Y drawn from some hypothesis set of functions.
– In the testing phase, when a new data point x ∈ X comes in, it is evaluated on hθ as yˆ = hθ(x). The
hat on y indicates that it is a predicted value.
Since hθ was chosen in a way to “best match” f on the training set D, it is expected that it will provide a
good approximation on a new data point. Namely, we have hθ(xi) ≈ yi for all (xi, yi) ∈ D and we should
have hθ(x) ≈ f(x) for (x, ·) /∈ D. Of course, this highly depends on the problem under consideration, the
data points, and the hypothesis set of functions.
In particular, linear models for machine learning use a hypothesis set of functions of the form hθ(x) =
g(θ
ᵀ
x) where θ = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θd)
ᵀ ∈ Rd+1 are the model parameters and g : R → Y is a function mapping
the linear calculation to the output space.
When the range of g is real-valued and thus the prediction result yˆ ∈ Y is a continuous value (e.g., a
quantity or a probability), we talk about regression. When the prediction result is a discrete value (e.g.,
a label), we talk about classification. An important sub-case is Y = {+1,−1}. Specific choices for g are
discussed in the next sections.
Linear Regression A linear regression model assumes that the real-valued target function f is linear—
or more generally affine—in the input variables. In other words, it is based on the premise that f is well
approximated by an affine map; i.e., g is the identity map: f(xi) ≈ g(θᵀxi) = θᵀxi, 1 6 i 6 n, for training
data xi ∈ X and weight vector θ ∈ Rd+1. This vector θ is interesting as it reveals how the output depends
on the input variables. In particular, the sign of a coefficient θj indicates either a positive or a negative
contribution to the output, while its magnitude captures the relative importance of this contribution.
The linear regression algorithm relies on the least squares method to find the coefficients of θ: it minimises
the sum of squared errors
∑n
i=1 (f(xi)− θᵀxi)2. Once θ has been computed, it can be used to produce
estimates on new data points x ∈ X as yˆ = θᵀx.
3
Support Vector Machines We now turn our attention to another important problem: how to classify
data into different classes. This corresponds to a target function f whose range Y is discrete. Of particular
interest is the case of two classes, say +1 and −1, in which case Y = {+1,−1}. Think for example of a binary
decision problem where +1 corresponds to a positive answer and −1 to a negative answer.
In dimension d, an hyperplane Π is given by an equation of the form θ0 + θ1X1 + θ2X2 + · · ·+ θdXd = 0
where θ′ = (θ1, . . . , θd)
ᵀ
is the normal vector to Π and θ0/‖θ′‖ indicates the offset from the origin.
When the training data are linearly separable, there is some hyperplane Π such that for each (xi, yi) ∈ D,
one has {
θ0 + θ1xi,1 + θ2xi,2 + · · ·+ θnxi,d > 0 if yi = +1
θ0 + θ1xi,1 + θ2xi,2 + · · ·+ θnxi,d < 0 if yi = −1
, 1 6 i 6 n , (1)
or equivalently (by scaling θ appropriately):
yi θ
ᵀ
xi > 1 , (1 6 i 6 n) .
The training data points xi satisfying yi θ
ᵀ
xi = 1 are called support vectors.
When the training data are not linearly separable, it is not possible to satisfy the previous hard constraint
yi θ
ᵀ
xi > 1, (1 6 i 6 n). So-called “slack variables” ξi = max(0, 1 − yi θᵀxi) are generally introduced in
the optimisation problem. They tell how large a violation of the hard constraint there is on each training
point—note that ξi = 0 whenever yi θ
ᵀ
xi > 1.
There are many possible choices for θ. For better classification, the separating hyperplane Π is chosen
so as to maximise the margin; namely, the minimal distance between any training data point and Π.
Now, from the resulting model θ, when a new data point x comes in, its class is estimated as the sign of
the discriminating function θ
ᵀ
x; i.e., yˆ = sign(θ
ᵀ
x). Compare with Eq. (1).
When there are more than two classes, the optimisation problem returns several vectors θk, each defining
a boundary between a particular class and all the others. The classification problem becomes an iteration to
find out which θk maximises θk
ᵀ
x for a given test point x.
Logistic Regression Logistic regression is widely used in predictive analysis to output a probability of
occurrence. The logistic function is defined by the sigmoid function
σ : R→ [0, 1], t 7→ σ(t) = 1
1 + e−t
. (2)
The logistic regression model returns hθ(x) = σ(θ
ᵀ
x) ∈ [0, 1], which can be interpreted as the probability
that x belongs to the class y = +1. The SVM classifier thresholds the value of θ
ᵀ
x around 0, assigning to
x the class y = +1 if θ
ᵀ
x > 0 and the class y = −1 if θᵀx < 0. In this respect, the logistic function is seen
as a soft threshold as opposed to the hard threshold, +1 or −1, offered by SVM. Other threshold functions
are possible. Another popular soft threshold relies on tanh, the hyperbolic tangent function, whose output
range is [−1, 1].
Remark 1. Because the logistic regression algorithm predicts probabilities rather than just classes, we fit it
through likelihood optimisation. Specifically, given the training set D, we learn the model by maximising∏
yi=+1
pi ·
∏
yi=−1(1 − pi) where pi = σ(θ
ᵀ
xi). This deviates from the general description of our problem
setup, where the learning is directly done on the pairs (xi, yi). However, the testing phase is unchanged: the
outcome is expressed as hθ(x) = σ(θ
ᵀ
x). It therefore fits our framework for private inference, that is, the
private evaluation of hθ(x) = g(θ
ᵀ
x) for a certain function g; the sigmoid function σ in this case.
2.2 Cryptographic Tools
Representing Real Numbers So far, we have discussed a number of machine learning models using real
numbers, but the cryptographic tools we intend to use require working on integers. We therefore start by
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recalling the necessary conversion. An encryption algorithm takes as input an encryption key and a plaintext
message and returns a ciphertext. We letM⊂ Z denote the set of messages that can be encrypted. In order
to operate over encrypted data, we need to accurately represent real numbers as elements ofM (i.e., a finite
subset of Z).
To do that, since all input variables of machine learning models are typically rescaled in the range [−1, 1],
one could use a fixed point representation. A real number x with a fractional part of at most P bits uniquely
corresponds to signed integer z = x · 2P . Hence, with a fixed-point representation, a real number x is
represented by
z = bx · 2P c ,
where integer P is called the bit-precision. The sum of x1, x2 ∈ R is performed as z1 + z2 and their multipli-
cation as b(z1 · z2)/2P c.
Additively Homomorphic Encryption Homomorphic encryption schemes come in different flavours. Be-
fore Gentry’s breakthrough result ([13]), only addition operations or multiplication operations on ciphertexts—
but not both—were supported. Schemes that can support an arbitrary number of additions and of multi-
plications are termed fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. Our privacy-preserving protocols only
need an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. The minimal security notion that we require is semantic
security [16]; in particular, encryption is probabilistic.
It is useful to introduce some notation. We let ⟦·⟧ and ⟧·⟦ denote the encryption and decryption algo-
rithms, respectively. The message space is an additive group M∼= Z/MZ. It consists of integers modulo M
and we view it as M = {−bM/2c, . . . , dM/2e − 1} in order to keep track of the sign. The elements of M
are uniquely identified with Z/MZ via the mapping Υ : M ∼→ Z/MZ, m 7→ m mod M . The inverse mapping
is given by Υ−1 : Z/MZ ∼→ M,m 7→ m if m < dM/2e and m 7→ m −M otherwise. Ciphertexts are noted
with Gothic letters. The encryption of a message m ∈ M is obtained using public key pk as m = ⟦m⟧pk .
It is then decrypted using the matching secret key sk as m = ⟧m⟦sk . When clear from the context, we
drop the pk or sk subscripts and sometimes use ⦃·⦄s and ⦄·⦃s to denote another encryption algorithm. If
m = (m1, . . . ,md) ∈Md is a vector, we write m = ⟦m⟧ as a shorthand for (m1, . . . ,md) = (⟦m1⟧, . . . , ⟦md⟧).
Algorithm ⟦·⟧ being additively homomorphic (overM) means that given any two plaintext messages m1
and m2 and their corresponding ciphertexts m1 = ⟦m1⟧ and m2 = ⟦m2⟧, we have m1  m2 = ⟦m1 + m2⟧
and m1 m2 = ⟦m1 −m2⟧ for some publicly known operations  and  on ciphertexts. By induction, for a
given integer scalar r ∈ Z, we also have
⟦r ·m1⟧ = ⟦m1 + · · ·+m1⟧ = ⟦m1⟧ · · · ⟦m1⟧
= m1  · · ·m1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r times
:= r m1 .
It is worth noting here that the decryption of (m1  m2) gives (m1 + m2) as an element of M; that is,⟧m1m2⟦ ≡ m1+m2 (mod M). Similarly, we also have ⟧m1m2⟦ ≡ m1−m2 (mod M) and ⟧rm1⟦ ≡ r·m1
(mod M).
Private Comparison Protocol In [9,10], Damg˚ard et al. present a protocol for comparing private values. It
was later extended and improved in [12] and [30,20]. The protocol makes use of an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme. It compares two non-negative `-bit integers. The message space is M ∼= Z/MZ with
M > 2` and is supposed to behave like an integral domain (for example, M a prime or an RSA-type
modulus).
DGK+ protocol The setting is as follows. A client possesses a private `-bit value µ =
∑`−1
i=0 µi 2
i and a server
possesses a private `-bit value η =
∑`−1
i=0 ηi 2
i. They seek to respectively obtain bits δC and δS such that
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δC ⊕ δS = [µ 6 η] (where ⊕ represents the exclusive or operator, and [Pred] = 1 if predicate Pred is true,
and 0 otherwise). Following [20, Fig. 1], the DGK+ protocol proceeds in four steps:
1. The client encrypts each bit µi of µ under its public key and sends ⟦µi⟧, 0 6 i 6 `− 1, to the server.
2. The server chooses uniformly at random a bit δS and defines s = 1 − 2δS. It also selects ` + 1 random
non-zero scalars ri ∈M, −1 6 i 6 `− 1.
3. Next, the server computes1
⟦h∗i ⟧ = ri  (⟦1⟧ ⟦s · µi⟧ ⟦s · ηi⟧ (`−1j=i+1⟦µj ⊕ ηj⟧))
for `− 1 > i > 0 ,⟦h∗−1⟧ = r−1  (⟦δS⟧`−1j=0⟦µj ⊕ ηj⟧) (3)
and sends the `+ 1 ciphertexts ⟦h∗i ⟧ in a random order to the client.
4. Using its private key, the client decrypts the received ⟦h∗i ⟧’s. If one is decrypted to zero, the client sets
δC = 1. Otherwise, it sets δC = 0.
Remark 2. At this point, neither the client, nor the server, knows whether µ 6 η holds. One of them (or
both) needs to reveal its share of δ (= δC ⊕ δS) so that the other can find out. Following the original DGK
protocol [9], this modified comparison protocol is secure in the semi-honest model (i.e., against honest but
curious adversaries).
Correctness The correctness of the protocol follows from the fact that µ 6 η if only and only if:
– µ = η, or
– there exists some index i, with 0 6 i 6 `− 1, such that:
1. µi < ηi, and
2. µj = ηj for i+ 1 6 j 6 `− 1 .
As pointed out in [9], when µ 6= η, this latter condition is equivalent to the existence of some index i ∈ [0, `−1],
such that µi − ηi + 1 +
∑`−1
j=i+1(µj ⊕ ηj) = 0. This test was subsequently replaced in [12,20] to allow the
secret sharing of the comparison bit across the client and the server as [µ 6 η] = δC ⊕ δS. Adapting [20], the
new test checks the existence of some index i ∈ [0, `− 1], such that
hi = s(µi − ηi) + 1 +
∑`−1
j=i+1(µj ⊕ ηj)
is zero. When δS = 0 (and thus s = 1) this occurs if µ < η; when δS = 1 (s = −1) this occurs if µ > η. As a
result, the first case yields δS = ¬[µ < η] = 1 ⊕ [µ < η] while the second case yields δS = [µ > η] = ¬[µ 6
η] = 1⊕ [µ 6 η]. This discrepancy is corrected in [30] by augmenting the set of hi’s with an additional value
h−1 given by h−1 = δS +
∑`−1
j=0(µj ⊕ ηj). It is worth observing that h−1 can only be zero when δS = 0 and
µ = η. Therefore, in all cases, when there exists some index i, with −1 6 i 6 ` − 1, such that hi = 0, we
have δS = 1⊕ [µ 6 η], or equivalently, [µ 6 η] = δS ⊕ 1.
It is easily verified that ⟦h∗i ⟧ as computed in Step 3 is the encryption of ri ·hi (mod M). Clearly, if ri ·hi
(mod M) is zero then so is hi since, by definition, ri is non-zero—remember that M is chosen such that
Z/MZ acts as an integral domain. Hence, if one of the ⟦h∗i ⟧’s decrypts to 0 then [µ 6 η] = δS ⊕ 1 = δS ⊕ δC ;
if not, one has [µ 6 η] = δS = δS ⊕ δC . This concludes the proof of correctness.
3 Basic Protocols of Privacy-Preserving Inference
In this section, we present three families of protocols for private inference. They aim to satisfy the ideal
requirements given in the introduction while keeping the number of exchanges to a bare minimum. Interest-
ingly, they only make use of additively homomorphic encryption.
1 Given ⟦µi⟧, the server obtains ⟦ηi ⊕ µi⟧ as ⟦µi⟧ if ηi = 0, and as ⟦1⟧ ⟦µi⟧ if ηi = 1.
6
We keep the general model presented in the introduction, but now work with integers only. The client
holds x = (1, x1, . . . , xd)
ᵀ ∈ Md+1, a private feature vector, and the server possesses a trained machine-
learning model given by its parameter vector θ = (θ0, . . . , θd)
ᵀ ∈Md+1 or, in the case of feed-forward neural
networks a set of matrices made of such vectors. At the end of protocol, the client obtains the value of g(θ
ᵀ
x)
for some function g and learns nothing else; the server learns nothing. To make the protocols easier to read,
for a real-valued function g, we abuse notation and write g(t) for an integer t assuming g also includes the
conversion to real values; see Section 2.2. We also make the distinction between the encryption algorithm ⟦·⟧
using the client’s public key and the encryption algorithm ⦃·⦄s using the server’s public key and stress that,
not only keys are different, but the algorithm could also be different. We use ⟧·⟦ and ⦄·⦃s for the respective
corresponding decryption algorithms.
3.1 Private Linear/Logistic Regression
Private Linear Regression As seen in Section 2.1, linear regression produces estimates using the identity
map for g: yˆ = θ
ᵀ
x. Since θ
ᵀ
x =
∑d
j=0 θj xj is linear, given an encryption ⟦x⟧ of x, the value of ⟦θᵀx⟧ can
be homomorphically evaluated, in a provably secure way [15].
Therefore, the client encrypts its feature vector x under its public key with an additively homomorphic
encryption algorithm ⟦·⟧, and sends ⟦x⟧ to the server. Using θ, the server then computes ⟦θᵀx⟧ and returns
it the client. Finally, the client uses its private key to decrypt ⟦θᵀx⟧ = ⟦yˆ⟧ and gets the output yˆ. This is
straightforward and only requires one round of communication.
Private Logistic Regression Things get more complicated for logistic regression. At first sight, it seems
counter-intuitive that additively homomorphic encryption could suffice to evaluate a logistic regression model
over encrypted data. After all, the sigmoid function, σ(t), is non-linear.
The key observation is that the sigmoid function is injective:
σ(t1) = σ(t2) =⇒ t1 = t2 .
So the client does not learn more about the model θ from t := θ
ᵀ
x than it can learn from yˆ := σ(t) since the
value of t can be recovered from yˆ using t = σ−1(yˆ) = ln(yˆ/(1− yˆ)). Consequently, rather than returning an
encryption of the prediction yˆ, we let the server return an encryption of t, without any security loss in doing
so.
Our Core Protocol The protocol we propose for privacy-preserving linear or logistic regression is detailed
in Fig. 2. Let (pkC , skC) denote the client’s matching pair of public encryption key/private decryption key
for an additively homomorphic encryption scheme ⟦·⟧. We use the notation of Section 2.2. If B is an upper
bound on the inner product (in absolute value), the message space M = {−bM/2c, . . . , dM/2e − 1} should
be such that M > 2B + 1.
In more detail, our core protocol goes as follows.
1. In a first step, the client encrypts its feature vector x ∈ Md+1 under its public key pkC and gets⟦x⟧ = (⟦x0⟧, ⟦x1⟧, . . . , ⟦xd⟧). The ciphertext ⟦x⟧ along with the client’s public key are sent to the
server.
2. In a second step, from its model θ, the server computes an encryption of the inner product over encrypted
data as:
t = ⟦θᵀx⟧ = ⟦θ0⟧ d
j=1
θj  ⟦xj⟧ .
The server returns t to the client.
3. In a third step, the client uses its private decryption key skC to decrypt t, and gets the inner product
t = θ
ᵀ
x as a signed integer of M.
4. In a final step, the client applies the g function to obtain the prediction yˆ corresponding to input vector x.
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Client (x) Server (θ)
(pkC , skC)
¶ compute ⟦x⟧ ⟦x1⟧, . . . , ⟦xd⟧, pkC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
· t← ⟦θᵀx⟧
t←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
¸ t← ⟧t⟦ (in M)
¹ yˆ = g(t)
Since x0 = 1 and is known to the server, it is not necessary to transmit the value of ⟦x0⟧.
Fig. 2: Privacy-preserving regression. Encryption is done using the client’s public key and noted ⟦·⟧. The
server learns nothing. Function g is the identity map for linear regression and the sigmoid function for
logistic regression.
Dual Approach The previous protocol encrypts with the client’s public key pkC . In the dual approach, the
server’s public key is used for encryption. Let (pkS, skS) denote the public/private key pair of the server for
some additively homomorphic encryption scheme
(⦃·⦄s,⦄·⦃s). The message space M is unchanged.
In this case, the server needs to publish an encrypted version ⦃θ⦄s of its model. The client must therefore
get a copy of ⦃θ⦄s once, but can then engage in the protocol as many times as it wishes. One could also
suppose that each client receives a different encryption of θ using a server’s encryption key specific to the
client, or that a key rotation is performed on a regular basis. This protocol uses a mask µ which is chosen
uniformly at random in M. Consequently, it is important to see that t∗ (≡ θᵀx + µ (mod M)) is also
uniformly distributed over M. Thus, the server gains no bit of information from t∗. The different steps are
summarised in Fig. 3.
Client (x) Server (θ)
(pkS, skS)
Server publishes: pkS and ⦃θ⦄s
¶ µ
R←M
· t∗ ← ⦃θᵀx+ µ⦄s
t∗−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
¸ t∗ ← ⦄t∗⦃s
t∗←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
¹ t← t∗ − µ (in M)
º yˆ = g(t)
Fig. 3: Dual approach for privacy-preserving regression. Here, encryption is done using the server’s public
key pkS and noted ⦃·⦄s. Function g is the identity map for linear regression and the sigmoid function for
logistic regression.
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Variant and Extensions In a variant, in Step 2 of Fig. 2 (resp. Step 3 of Fig. 3), the server can add
some noise  by defining t as t ← ⟦θᵀx + ⟧ = ⟦θᵀx⟧  ⟦⟧ (resp. t∗ as t∗ ← ⦄t∗⦃s + ). This presents
the advantage of limiting the leakage on θ resulting from the output result. The proposed methods are not
limited to the identity map or the sigmoid function but generalise to any injective function g. This includes
the tanh activation function alluded to in Section 2.1 where g(t) = tanh(t), as well as
g(t) = arctan(t) [arctan] , g(t) = t/(1 + |t|) [softsign] ,
g(t) = ln(1 + et) [softplus] , g(t) =
{
0.01t for t < 0
t for t > 0
[leaky ReLU] ,
and more. For any injective function g, there is no more information leakage in returning θ
ᵀ
x than g(θ
ᵀ
x).
3.2 Private SVM Classification
As discussed in Section 2.1, SVM inference can be abridged to the evaluation of the sign of an inner product.
However, the sign function is clearly not injective. Our idea is to make use of a privacy-preserving comparison
protocol. For concreteness, we consider the DGK+ protocol; but any privacy-preserving comparison protocol
could be adapted.
A Na¨ıve Protocol A client holding a private feature vector x wishes to evaluate sign(θ
ᵀ
x) where θ
parametrises an SVM classification model. In the primal approach, the client can encrypt x and send ⟦x⟧ to
the server. Next, the server computes ⟦η⟧ = ⟦θᵀx+ µ⟧ for some random mask µ and sends ⟦η⟧ to the client.
The client decrypts ⟦η⟧ and recovers η. Finally, the client and the server engage in a private comparison
protocol with respective inputs η and µ, and the client deduces the sign of θ
ᵀ
x from the resulting comparison
bit [µ 6 η].
There are two issues. If we use the DGK+ protocol for the private comparison, at least one extra exchange
from the server to the client is needed for the client to get [µ 6 η]. This can be fixed by considering the
dual approach. A second, more problematic, issue is that the decryption of ⟦η⟧ := ⟦θᵀx+ µ⟧ yields η as an
element of M ∼= Z/MZ, which is not necessarily equivalent to the integer θᵀx + µ. Note that if the inner
product θ
ᵀ
x can take any value inM, selecting a smaller value for µ ∈M to prevent the modular reduction
does not solve the issue because the value of η may then leak information on θ
ᵀ
x.
Our Core Protocol Instead, we suggest to select the message space much larger than the upper bound B
on the inner product, so that the computation will take place over the integers. Specifically, if θ
ᵀ
x ∈ [−B,B]
then, letting ` be the bit-length of B, the message space M = {−bM/2c, . . . , dM/2e − 1} is dimensioned
such that M > 2`(2κ + 1)− 1 for some security parameter κ. Let µ be an (`+ κ)-bit integer that is chosen
such that µ > B. By construction we will then have 0 6 θᵀx+ µ < M so that the decrypted value modulo
M corresponds to the actual integer value. As will become apparent, this presents the further advantage of
optimising the bandwidth requirements: the number of exchanged ciphertexts depends on the length of B
and not on the length of M (notice that M = #M).
Our resulting core protocol for private SVM classification of a feature vector x is illustrated in Fig. 4 and
includes the following steps:
0. The server publishes pkS and ⦃θ⦄s.
1. Let κ be a security parameter. The client starts by picking uniformly at random in [2` − 1, 2`+κ) an
integer µ =
∑`+κ−1
i=0 µi 2
i .
2. In a second step, the client computes, over encrypted data, the inner product θ
ᵀ
x and masks the result
with µ to get
t∗ = ⦃θ0⦄s  ( d
j=1
xj  ⦃θj⦄s) ⦃µ⦄s .
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3. Next, the client individually encrypts the first ` bits of µ with its own encryption key to get ⟦µi⟧, for
0 6 i 6 `− 1, and sends t∗ and the ⟦µi⟧’s to the server.
4. Upon reception, the server decrypts t∗ to get t∗ := ⦄t∗⦃s mod M = θᵀx+µ and defines the `-bit integer
η := t∗ mod 2`.
5. The DGK+ protocol is now applied to two `-bit values µ := µ mod 2` =
∑`−1
i=0 µi 2
i and η =
∑`−1
i=0 ηi 2
i.
The server selects the (`+ 1)-th bit of t∗ for δS (i.e., δS = bt∗/2`c mod 2), defines s = 1− 2δS, and forms
the ⟦h∗i ⟧’s (with −1 6 i 6 ` − 1) as defined by Eq. (3). The server permutes randomly the ⟦h∗i ⟧’s and
sends them to the client.
6. The client decrypts the ⟦h∗i ⟧’s and gets the h∗i ’s. If one of them is zero, it sets δC = 1; otherwise it sets
δC = 0.
7. As a final step, the client obtains the predicted class as yˆ = (−1)¬(δC⊕µ`), where µ` denotes bit number `
of µ.
Client (x) Server (θ)
(pkC , skC) (pkS, skS)
Server publishes: pkS and ⦃θ⦄s
¶ µ
R← [2` − 1, 2`+κ)
=
∑`+κ−1
i=0 µi 2
i
· t∗ ← ⦃θᵀx+ µ⦄s
¸ compute ⟦µi⟧, for 0 6 i 6 `− 1
t∗, ⟦µ0⟧, . . . , ⟦µ`−1⟧−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
¹ • t∗ ← ⦄t∗⦃s mod M
• η ← t∗ mod 2`
=
∑`−1
i=0 ηi 2
i
º • δS ← bt∗/2`c mod 2
• compute ⟦h∗i ⟧, for −1 6 i 6 `− 1{⟦h∗−1⟧, . . . , ⟦h∗`−1⟧}
in random order←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
» δC ← [∃i | h∗i = 0]
¼ yˆ = (−1)¬(δC⊕µ`)
Fig. 4: Privacy-preserving SVM classification. Note that some data is encrypted using the client’s public
key pkC , while other, is encrypted using the server’s public key pkS. They are noted ⟦·⟧ and ⦃·⦄s respectively.
Again, the proposed protocol keeps the number of interactions between the client and the server to a
minimum: a request and a response.
Correctness To prove the correctness, we need the two following simple lemmata.
Lemma 1. Let a and b be two non-negative integers. Then for any positive integer n, b(a−b)/nc = ba/nc−
bb/nc+ b((a mod n)− (b mod n))/nc.
Proof. Write a =
⌊
a
n
⌋
n+ (a mod n) and b =
⌊
b
n
⌋
n+ (b mod n). Then a− b = (⌊ an⌋− ⌊ bn⌋)n+ (a mod n)−
(b mod n). Recalling that for n0 ∈ Z and x ∈ R, bx+n0c = bxc+n0 and b−n0c = −bn0c, the lemma follows
by integer division through n. uunionsq
Lemma 2. Let a and b be two non-negative integers smaller than some positive integer n. Then [b 6 a] =
1 + b(a− b)/nc.
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Proof. By definition 0 6 a < n and 0 6 b < n. If b 6 a then 0 6 a−bn < 1 and thus
⌊
a−b
n
⌋
= 0; otherwise, if
b > a then −1 < a−bn < 0 and so
⌊
a−b
n
⌋
= −1. uunionsq
Remember that, by construction, θ
ᵀ
x ∈ [−B,B] with B = 2`−1, that µ ∈ [2`−1, 2`+κ), and by definition
that t∗ := ⦄t∗⦃s mod M with t∗ = ⦃θᵀx+µ⦄s. Hence, in Step 4, the server gets t∗ = θᵀx+µ mod M = θᵀx+µ
(over Z) since 0 6 θᵀx + µ 6 2` − 1 + 2`+κ − 1 < M . Let δ := δC ⊕ δS = [µ 6 η] (with µ := µ mod 2` and
η := t∗ mod 2`) denote the result of the private comparison in Steps 5 and 6 with the DGK+ protocol.
Either of those two conditions holds true{
0 6 θᵀx < 2` ⇐⇒ 1 6 θ
ᵀ
x+2`
2`
< 2 ⇐⇒ ⌊θᵀx+2`
2`
⌋
= 1
−2` < θᵀx < 0 ⇐⇒ 0 < θ
ᵀ
x+2`
2`
< 1 ⇐⇒ ⌊θᵀx+2`
2`
⌋
= 0
,
and so,
[θ
ᵀ
x > 0] =
⌊
θ
ᵀ
x+2`
2`
⌋
=
⌊
t∗−µ
2`
⌋
+ 1 since t∗ = θ
ᵀ
x+ µ
=
⌊
t∗
2`
⌋− ⌊ µ
2`
⌋
+
⌊η−µ
2`
⌋
+ 1 by Lemma 1
=
⌊
t∗
2`
⌋− ⌊ µ
2`
⌋
+ δ by Lemma 2
=
(⌊
t∗
2`
⌋− ⌊ µ
2`
⌋
+ δ
)
mod 2 since [θ
ᵀ
x > 0] ∈ {0, 1}
=
(⌊
µ
2`
⌋
+ δC
)
mod 2 since δS = bt∗/2`c mod 2
= µ` ⊕ δC .
Now, noting sign(θ
ᵀ
x) = (−1)¬[θᵀx>0], we get the desired result.
Security The security of the protocol of Fig. 4 follows from the fact that the inner product θ
ᵀ
x is statistically
masked by the random value µ. Security parameter κ guarantees that the probability of an information leak
due to a carry is negligible. The security also depends on the security of the DGK+ comparison protocol,
which is provably secure (cf. Remark 2).
A Heuristic Protocol The previous protocol, thanks to the use of the DGK+ algorithm offers provable
security guarantees but incurs the exchange of 2(`+ 1) ciphertexts. Here we aim to reduce the number
of ciphertexts and introduce a new heuristic protocol. This protocol requires the introduction of a signed
factor λ, such that |λ| > |µ|, and we now use both µ and λ to mask the model. To ensure that λθᵀx+ µ
remains within the message space, we pick λ in B where
B :=
[
−
⌈dM/2e
B + 1
⌉
,
⌊dM/2e
B + 1
⌋]
.
Furthermore, to ensure the effectiveness of the masking, B should be sufficiently large; namely, #B > 2κ for
a security parameter κ, hence M > 2`(2κ − 1).
The protocol, which is illustrated in Fig. 5, runs as follows:
1. The client encrypts its input data x using its public key, and sends its key and the encrypted data to
the server.
2. The server draws at random a signed scaling factor λ ∈ B, λ 6= 0, and an offset factor µ ∈ B such
that |µ| < |λ| and sign(µ) = sign(λ). The server then defines the bit δS such that sign(λ) = (−1)δS and
computes an encryption t∗ of the shifted and scaled inner product t∗ = (−1)δS · (λθᵀx+ µ) as
t∗ =
⟦
(−1)δS µ⟧ d
i=0
(
(−1)δSλ θi
) ⟦xi⟧ ,
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and sends t∗ to the client.2
3. In the final step, the client decrypts t∗ using its private key, recovers t∗ as a signed integer of M, and
deduces the class of the input data as yˆ = sign(t∗).
Client (x) Server (θ)
(pkC , skC)
¶ compute ⟦x⟧ ⟦x1⟧, . . . , ⟦xd⟧, pkC−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
· • λ, µ R← B, λ 6= 0, |µ| < |λ|
and sign(µ) = sign(λ)
• δS ← 12 (1− sign(λ))
• t∗ ← (−1)δS  ⟦λθᵀx+ µ⟧
t∗←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
¸ • t∗ ← ⟧t∗⟦ (in M)
• yˆ = sign(t∗)
Fig. 5: Heuristic protocol for privacy-preserving SVM classification.
Correctness The constraint |µ| < |λ| with λ 6= 0 ensures that yˆ = sign(θᵀx). Indeed, as (−1)δS = sign(λ) =
sign(µ), we have t∗ = (−1)δS (λθᵀx + µ) = |λ|θᵀx + |µ| = |λ|(θᵀx + ) with  := |µ|/|λ|. Hence, whenever
θ
ᵀ
x 6= 0, we get yˆ = sign(t∗) = sign(θᵀx+ ) = sign(θᵀx) since |θᵀx| > 1 and || = |µ|/|λ| < 1. If θᵀx = 0
then yˆ = sign() = 1.
Security We stress that the private comparison protocol we use in Fig. 5 does not come with formal security
guarantees. In particular, the client learns the value of t∗ = λθᵀx + µ with λ, µ ∈ B and |µ| < |λ|. Some
information on t := θ
ᵀ
x may be leaking from t∗ and, in turn, on θ since x is known to the client. The
reason resides in the constraint |µ| < |λ|. So, from t∗ = λθᵀx+ µ, we deduce log|t∗| 6 log|λ|+ log (|t|+ 1).
For example, when t has two possible very different “types” of values (say, very large and very small), the
quantity log|t∗| can be enough to discriminate with non-negligible probability the type of t. This may possibly
leak information on θ. That does not mean that the protocol is necessarily insecure but it should be used
with care.
Remark 3. The bandwidth usage could be even reduced to one ciphertext and a single bit with the dual
approach. From the published encrypted model ⦃θ⦄s, the client could homomorphically compute and send
to the server t∗ = ⦃λθᵀx + µ⦄s for random λ, µ ∈ B with |µ| < |λ|. The server would then decrypt t∗,
obtain t∗, compute δS = 12 (1 − sign(t∗)), and return δS to the client. Analogously to the primal approach,
the output class yˆ = sign(θ
ᵀ
x) is obtained by the client as yˆ = (−1)δS · sign(λ). However, and contrarily to
the primal approach, the potential information leakage resulting from t∗—in this case on x—is now on the
server’s side, which is in contradiction with our Requirement 1 (input confidentiality). We do not further
discuss this variant.
2 Note that instead, one could define λ, µ
R← B with λ > 0 and |µ| < λ, and t∗ = λθᵀx+ µ. We however prefer the
other formulation as it easily generalises to extended settings (see Section 4.1).
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4 Application to Neural Networks
Typical feed-forward neural networks are represented as large graphs. Each node on the graph is often called
a unit, and these units are organised into layers. At the very bottom is the input layer with a unit for
each of the coordinates x
(0)
j of the input vector x
(0) := x ∈ X . Then various computations are done in a
bottom-to-top pass and the output yˆ ∈ Y comes out all the way at the very top of the graph. Between the
input and output layers, a number of hidden layers are evaluated. We index the layers with a superscript
(l), where l = 0 for the input layer and 1 6 l < L for the hidden layers. Layer L corresponds to the output.
Each unit of each layer has directed connections to the units of the layer below; see Fig. 6a.
Hidden layer l · · ·
x
(l)
j−1 x
(l)
j x
(l)
j+1
· · ·
Hidden layer l − 1
x
(l−1)
1 x
(l−1)
2
. . .
x
(l−1)
dl−1
θ
(l)
j,1
θ
(l)
j,2
θ (l)
j,d
l−
1
(a) Going from layer l − 1 to layer l.
... Σ g(l)j
Activation
function
x
(l)
j
Output
x
(l−1)
1 θ
(l)
j,1
Weights
x
(l−1)
2 θ
(l)
j,2
x
(l−1)
dl−1 θ
(l)
j,dl−1
Bias
θ
(l)
j,0
In
p
u
ts
(b) Zoom on computing unit j in layer l.
Fig. 6: Relationship between a hidden unit in layer l and the hidden units of layer l − 1 in a feed-forward
neural network.
Figure 6b details the outcome x
(l)
j of the j
th computing unit in layer l. We keep the convention x
(l)
0 := 1
for all layers. If we note θj
(l) the vector of weight coefficients θ
(l)
j,k, 0 6 k 6 dl−1, where dl is the number of
units in layer l, then x
(l)
j can be expressed as:
x
(l)
j = g
(l)
j
((
θj
(l)
)ᵀ
x(l−1)
)
= g
(l)
j
(
θ
(l)
j,0 +
∑dl−1
k=1 θ
(l)
j,k x
(l−1)
k
)
, 1 6 j 6 dl, 1 6 l 6 L . (4)
Functions g
(l)
j are non-linear functions such as the sign function or the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) function
t 7→
{
t if t > 0
0 otherwise
t
g(t)
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Those functions are known as activation functions. Other examples of activation functions are defined in
Section 3.1. The weight coefficients characterise the model and are known only to the owner of the model.
Each hidden layer depends on the layer below, and ultimately on the input data x(0), known solely to the
client.
Generic Solution A generic solution can easily be devised from Eq. (4): for each inner product computation,
and therefore for each unit of each hidden layer, the server computes the encrypted inner product and the
client computes the output of the activation function in the clear. In more detail, the evaluation of a neural
network can go as follows.
0. The client starts by encrypting its input data and sends it to the server.
1. Then, as illustrated in Fig. 7, for each hidden layer l, 1 6 l < L:
(a) The server computes dl encrypted inner products tj corresponding to each unit j of the layer and
sends those to the client.
(b) The client decrypts the inner products, applies the required activation function g
(l)
j , re-encrypts, and
sends back dl encrypted values.
2. During the last round (l = L), the client simply decrypts the tj values and applies the corresponding
activation function g
(L)
j to each unit j of the output layer. This is the required result.
Client (x(0)) Server ({θji(i)} 16i6L
06ji6di
)
(pkC , skC)
⟦x⟧← ⟦x(l−1)⟧
for j = 1 to dl do
t
(l)
j ←
⟦(
θj
(l)
)ᵀ
x
⟧
endfort
(l)
1 , . . . , t
(l)
dl←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−for j = 1 to dl do
t
(l)
j ← ⟧t(l)j ⟦
x
(l)
j ← g(l)j (tj)
endfor ⟦x(l)1 ⟧, . . . , ⟦x(l)dl ⟧−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ l← l + 1
Fig. 7: Generic solution for privacy-preserving evaluation of feed-forward neural networks. Evaluation of
hidden layer l.
For each hidden layer l, exactly two messages (each comprising dl encrypted values) are exchanged. The
input and output layers only involve one exchange; from the client to the server for the input layer and from
the server back to the client for the output layer.
Several variations are considered in [6]. For increased security, provided that the units feature the same
type of activation functions in a given layer l (i.e., g
(l)
1 = g
(l)
2 = · · · = g(l)dl ), the server may first apply
a random permutation on all units (i.e., sending the tj ’s in a random order). It then recovers the correct
ordering by applying the inverse permutation on the received ⟦x(l)j ⟧’s. The server may also want to hide the
activation functions. In this case, the client holds the raw signal tj := t
(l)
j = (θj
(l))
ᵀ
x and the server the
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corresponding activation function g
(l)
j . The suggestion of [6] is to approximate the activation function as a
polynomial and to rely on oblivious polynomial evaluation [26] for the client to get x
(l)
j ≈ P (l)j (tj) without
learning polynomial P
(l)
j approximating g
(l)
j . Finally, the server may desire not to disclose the topology of
the network. To this end, the server can distort the client’s perception by adding dummy units and/or layers.
In the following two sections, we improve this generic solution for two popular activation functions: the
sign and the ReLU functions. In the new proposed implementations, everything is kept encrypted—from
start to end. The raw signals are hidden from the client’s view in all intermediate computations.
4.1 Sign Activation
Binarised neural networks implement the sign function as activation function. This is very advantageous
from a hardware perspective [18].
Section 3.2 describes two protocols for the client to get the sign of θ
ᵀ
x. In order to use them for binarised
neural networks in a setting similar to the generic solution, the server needs to get an encryption of sign(θ
ᵀ
x)
for each computing unit j in layer l under the client’s key from ⟦x⟧, where ⟦x⟧ := ⟦x(l−1)⟧ is the encrypted
output of layer l − 1 and θ := θj (l) is the parameter vector for unit j in layer l.
We start with the core protocol of Fig. 4. It runs in dual mode and therefore uses the server’s encryption.
Exchanging the roles of the client and the server almost gives rise to the sought-after protocol. The sole extra
change is to ensure that the server gets the classification result encrypted. This can be achieved by masking
the value of δC with a random bit b and sending an encryption of (−1)b. The resulting protocol is depicted
in Fig. 8a.
In the heuristic protocol (cf. Fig. 5), the server already gets an encryption of ⟦x⟧ as an input. It however
fixes the sign of t∗ to that of θᵀx. If now the server flips it in a probabilistic manner, the output class (i.e.,
sign(θ
ᵀ
x)) will be hidden from the client’s view. We detail below the modifications to be brought to the
heuristic protocol to accommodate the new setting:
– In Step 2 of Fig. 5, the server keeps private the value of δS by replacing the definition of t
∗ with
t∗ = ⟦λθᵀx+ µ⟧.
– In Step 3 of Fig. 5, the client then obtains yˆ∗ := sign(θᵀx) · (−1)δS and returns its encryption ⟦yˆ∗⟧ to
the server.
– The server obtains ⟦yˆ⟧ as ⟦yˆ⟧ = (−1)δS  ⟦yˆ∗⟧.
If θ := θj
(l) and ⟦x⟧ := ⟦x(l)⟧ then the outcome of the protocol of Fig. 8a or of the modified heuristic
protocol is ⟦yˆ⟧ = ⟦x(l)j ⟧. Of course, this can be done in parallel for all the dl units of layer l (i.e., for 1 6 j 6 dl;
see Eq. (4)), yielding ⟦x(l)⟧ = (⟦1⟧, ⟦x(l)1 ⟧, . . . , ⟦x(l)dl ⟧). This means that just one round of communication
between the server and the client suffices per hidden layer.
4.2 ReLU Activation
A widely used activation function is the ReLU function. It allows a network to easily obtain sparse represen-
tations and features cheaper computations as there is no need for computing the exponential function [14].
The ReLU function can be expressed from the sign function as
ReLU(t) = 12 (1 + sign(t)) · t . (5)
Back to our setting, the problem is for the server to obtain ⟦ReLU(t)⟧ from ⟦t⟧, where t = θᵀx with x :=
x(l−1) and θ := θj (l), in just one round of communication per hidden layer. We saw in the previous section
how to do it for the sign function. The ReLU function is more complex to apprehend. If we use Equation (5),
the difficulty is to let the server evaluate a product over encrypted data. To get around that, the server super-
encrypts ⟦θᵀx⟧, gets ⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄
s
, and sends it the client. According to its secret share the client sends back the
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Client Server (θ, ⟦x⟧)
¶ µ
R← [2` − 1, 2`+κ)
=
∑`+κ−1
i=0 µi 2
i
· t∗ ← ⟦θᵀx+ µ⟧
¸ compute ⦃µi⦄s, for 0 6 i 6 `− 1
t∗, ⦃µ0⦄s, . . . ,⦃µ`−1⦄s←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
¹ • t∗ ← ⟧t∗⟦ mod M
• η ← t∗ mod 2`
=
∑`−1
i=0 ηi 2
i
º • b R← {0, 1}; yˆ∗ ← (−1)b
• δC ← (bt∗/2`c mod 2)⊕ b
• compute ⦃h∗i ⦄s, for −1 6 i 6 `− 1⟦yˆ∗⟧, {⦃h∗−1⦄s, . . . ,⦃h∗`−1⦄s}
in random order−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
» δS ← [∃i | h∗i = 0]
¼ ⟦yˆ⟧ = (−1)¬(δS⊕µ`)  ⟦yˆ∗⟧
l← l + 1
The roles of the client and the server are interchanged, compared to Fig. 4: so ⟦·⟧ and ⦃·⦄s are interchanged and so are δC and
δS ; s = 1− 2δC .
In Step 7, we abuse the yˆ notation to mean either the input to the next layer or the final output.
(a) Core version.
Client Server (θ, ⟦x⟧)
¶ λ, µ
R← B, λ 6= 0, |µ| < |λ|
and sign(µ) = sign(λ)
· δS ← 12 (1− sign(λ))
¸ t∗ ← ⟦λθᵀx+ µ⟧
t∗←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
¹ • t∗ ← ⟧t∗⟦ (in M)
• yˆ∗ = sign(t∗) ⟦yˆ∗⟧−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
º ⟦yˆ⟧ = (−1)δS  ⟦yˆ∗⟧
l← l + 1
(b) Heuristic version.
Fig. 8: Privacy-preserving sign evaluation with inputs and outputs encrypted under the client’s public key.
This serves as a building block for the evaluation over encrypted data of the sign activation function in a
neural network and shows the computations and message exchanges for one unit in one hidden layer.
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pair
(⦃⟦0⟧⦄
s
,
⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄
s
)
or
(⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄
s
,
⦃⟦0⟧⦄
s
)
. The server then uses its secret share to select the correct
item in the received pair, decrypts it, and obtains ⟦ReLU(θᵀx)⟧. For this to work, it is important that the
client re-randomises
⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄
s
as otherwise the server could distinguish it from
⦃⟦0⟧⦄
s
. For an additively
homomorphic encryption algorithm ⦃·⦄s, this can be achieved by adding (over encrypted data) an encryption
of ⟦0⟧, ⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄
s
← ⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄
s 
⦃⟦0⟧⦄
s
. Notice that
⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄
s 
⦃⟦0⟧⦄
s
=
⦃⟦θᵀx⟧ ⟦0⟧⦄s = ⦃⟦θᵀx⟧⦄s
where the ‘’ in the left-hand side denotes the addition over ⦃·⦄s while the second one denotes the addition
over ⟦·⟧.
Actually, a simple one-time pad suffices to implement the above solution. To do so, the server chooses
a random mask µ ∈ M and “super-encrypts” ⟦θᵀx⟧ as ⟦θᵀx + µ⟧. The client re-randomises it as t∗∗ :=⟦θᵀx+µ⟧⟦0⟧, computes o := ⟦0⟧, and returns the pair (o, t∗∗) or (t∗∗, o), depending on its secret share. The
server uses its secret share to select the correct item and “decrypts” it. If the server (obliviously) picked o,
it already has the result in the right form; i.e., ⟦0⟧. Otherwise the server has to remove the mask µ so as to
get ⟦θᵀx⟧← t∗∗  ⟦µ⟧. In order to allow the server to (obliviously) remove or not the mask, the client also
sends an encryption of the pair index; e.g., 0 for the pair (o, t∗∗) and 1 for the pair (t∗∗, o).
Figure 9a details an implementation of this with the DGK+ comparison protocol. Note that to save on
bandwidth the same mask µ is used for the comparison protocol and to “super-encrypt” ⟦θᵀx⟧. The heuristic
protocol can be adapted in a similar way; see Fig. 9b
Remark 4. It is interesting to note that the new protocols readily extend to any piece-wise linear function,
such as the clip function clip(t) = max(0,min(1, t+12 )) (a.k.a. hard-sigmoid function). Indeed, as shown in [5],
any piece-wise linear function R→ R with p pieces can be represented as a sum of p ReLU functions.
5 Numerical Experiments
To show the feasibility of our protocols, we consider their implementation using Paillier’s cryptosystem.
In this section we first recall this cryptosystem and then give timing measurements of code execution and
message size estimation showing the feasibility of the proposed methods.
5.1 Paillier’s Cryptosystem
Paillier’s cryptosystem [27] is an asymmetric algorithm which is homomorphic to addition: with the encrypted
values of two messages m1 and m2, it is possible to compute an encrypted value of m1 +m2. The scheme is
known to be semantically secure under the decisional composite residuosity assumption (DCRA).
Set-up — On input, given a security parameter, each party can create a key pair by picking at random two
large primes p and q and computing the product N = p q. The public key is simply pk := N while the
private key is sk := {p, q}. The message space is M = Z/NZ.
Encryption — To encrypt a message m ∈ M, using the public key pk , one first picks a random integer
r
R← [1, N) and then computes the ciphertext
m := ⟦m⟧ = (1 +mN) rN mod N2 .
Decryption — To decrypt the ciphertext m, the recipient first needs to recover r from m using the matching
secret key sk as
r = mN
−1 mod (p−1)(q−1) mod N with λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1)
and then recover the plaintext message m = (m r
−N mod N2)−1
N .
Homomorphism The main homomorphism characteristics of this scheme are summarised as follows:
⟦m1 +m2⟧ = ⟦m1⟧ ⟦m2⟧ = ⟦m1⟧ · ⟦m2⟧ mod N2 ;⟦m1 −m2⟧ = ⟦m1⟧ ⟦m2⟧ = ⟦m1⟧/⟦m2⟧ mod N2 ;⟦a ·m⟧ = a  ⟦m⟧ = ⟦m⟧a mod N2 .
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Client Server (θ, ⟦x⟧)
¶ µ
R← [2` − 1, 2`+κ)
=
∑`+κ−1
i=0 µi 2
i
· t∗ ← ⟦θᵀx+ µ⟧
¸ compute ⦃µi⦄s, for 0 6 i 6 `− 1
t∗, ⦃µ0⦄s, . . . ,⦃µ`−1⦄s←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−¹ • t∗ ← ⟧t∗⟦ mod M
• η ← t∗ mod 2`
=
∑`−1
i=0 ηi 2
i
º • b R← {0, 1}
• δC ← (bt∗/2`c mod 2)⊕ b
• compute ⦃h∗i ⦄s, for −1 6 i 6 `− 1
» • o← ⟦0⟧; t∗∗ ← t∗  ⟦0⟧
• z←
{
(o, t∗∗) if b = 0
(t∗∗, o) if b = 1 ⟦b⟧, z, {⦃h∗−1⦄s, . . . ,⦃h∗`−1⦄s}
in random order−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
¼ parse z as (z[0], z[1])
½ • δS ← [∃i | h∗i = 0]
• δ′ ← δS ⊕ µ`
Ł ⟦yˆ⟧ = z[δ′] (µ ⟦b⊕ δ′⟧)
(a) Core version.
Client Server (θ, ⟦x⟧)
¶ λ, µ
R← B, λ 6= 0, |µ| < |λ|
and sign(µ) = sign(λ)
· δS ← 12 (1− sign(λ))
¸ t∗ ← ⟦λθᵀx+ µ⟧
t∗←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−¹ t∗ ← ⟧t∗⟦ (in M)
º b← 1
2
(1− sign(t∗))
» • 0← ⟦0⟧; t∗∗ ← t∗  ⟦0⟧
• z←
{
(0, t∗∗) if b = 0
(t∗∗, 0) if b = 1 ⟦b⟧, z−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
¼ parse z as (z[0], z[1])
½ δ′ ← ¬δS
Ł ⟦yˆ⟧ = λ−1  (z[δ′] (µ ⟦b⊕ δ′⟧)
(b) Heuristic version.
Fig. 9: Privacy-preserving ReLU evaluation with inputs and outputs encrypted under the client’s public key.
18
5.2 Graphs
We implemented the protocols presented in the previous sections using the Python (version 3.7.4) program-
ming language and the GNU multiprecision arithmeic library (GMP version 6.1.2) on a 64-bit machine
equipped with an Intel i7-4770 processor running at 3.4GHz. The GMP library is essentially used for gener-
ating the prime numbers required for the keys and for performing modular exponentiation of large integers.
We used a bit precision of P = 53 (see Section 2.2), which corresponds to the number of significant bits for
typical IEEE-754 floating point numbers supported by Python.
We tested the protocols using randomly generated models and also models based on the Enron-spam data
set [24], a standardized audiology data set [28], a credit approval data set [1], a dataset of human activity
recognition using smartphones [4], and the breast cancer database from University of Wisconsin Hospitals,
Madison [31]. Performance measurements for various key sizes are presented in Fig. 10, Fig. 11, Fig. 12,
Fig. 13, and Fig. 14. Computing times are average over 100 iterations of each protocol on each model. The
computing time depends mostly on modular exponentiation of large integers and is linear in the size of the
model.
We selected the different key sizes to adequate protection until years from 2020 to 2050 using Lenstra’s
method [22]. Those key sizes correspond to a security parameter κ between 82 and 102 which means that we
compare between 193 and 221 bits (depending on the number of features) when using the DGK+ protocol.
5.3 Estimation of Message Sizes
The size of exchanged messages highly depends on the implementation and the encoding used. We chose to
give a theoretical estimate of the size of messages exchanged during the protocols.
In order to give the reader a concrete idea of size the of the messages we provide numerical estimates.
For those, we imposed a strong encryption for Paillier’s algorithm and choose `M = log2(M) = 2048 bits,
corresponding security parameter κ = 95 (see [22]). With Paillier’s scheme the size of ciphertext is 2`M
bits. We selected a model with d = 30 features. To get a bit-size estimate ` of the upperbound on inner
products, we assumed that model weights and input data are normalised so that |xi| 6 1 and |θ| 6 1
when considering their real value or equivalently |xi| 6 2P and |θ| 6 2P when considering their integer
representation (see Section 2.2). Hence B = (d+ 1)22P and ` = 2P + dlog2(d+ 1)e = 111. In the case of feed
forward neural networks, we chose L = 3 and dl = d = 30 (0 6 l 6 L).
Message sizes and their numerical estimates are summarised in Table 1.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we presented several protocols for privacy-preserving regression and classification. Those proto-
cols only require additively homomorphic encryption and limit interactions to a mere request and response.
They are secure against semi-honest adversaries. They can be used as-is in generalised linear models (in-
cluding logistic regression and SVM classification) or applied to other machine-learning algorithms. As an
illustration, we showed how they nicely adapt to binarised neural networks or to feed-forward neural networks
with the ReLU activation function.
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(b) Breast cancer dataset.
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(c) Credit dataset.
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(d) Audiology dataset.
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(e) Human activity recognition dataset.
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(f) Enron-Spam dataset.
Fig. 10: Average computing time in milli-seconds for client and server side using data sets of various sizes,
using the private linear regression core protocol.
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(a) Random dataset.
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(b) Breast cancer dataset.
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(c) Credit dataset.
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(d) Audiology dataset.
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(e) Human activity recognition dataset.
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(f) Enron-Spam dataset.
Fig. 11: Average computing time in milli-seconds for client and server side using data sets of various sizes,
using the linear regression dual protocol.
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(a) Random dataset.
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(b) Breast cancer dataset.
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(c) Credit dataset.
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(d) Audiology dataset.
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(e) Human activity recognition dataset.
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(f) Enron-Spam dataset.
Fig. 12: Average computing time in milli-seconds for client and server side using data sets of various sizes,
using the SVM core protocol.
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(a) Random dataset.
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(b) Breast cancer dataset.
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(c) Credit dataset.
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(d) Audiology dataset.
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(e) Human activity recognition dataset.
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(f) Enron-Spam dataset.
Fig. 13: Average computing time in milli-seconds for client and server side using data sets of various sizes,
using the SVM heuristic protocol.
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(a) Generic protocol
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(b) Private ReLU activation function
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(c) Private sign activation function
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(d) Heuristic protocol with sign activation
Fig. 14: Performance of private feed forward neural network evaluation using different activation function
and protocols.
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Table 1: Message sizes for the various protocols presented in the paper.
Protocol Protocol step Size (kB)
Linear/Logistic regression
(core) — Fig. 2
Client sends: pkC ,
{⟦xi⟧}16i6d `M + d · 2`M ≈ 15
Server sends: t ≈ 2`M < 1
Linear/Logistic regression
(dual) — Fig. 3
Server publishes: pkS,
{⦃θi⦄s}06i6d `M + (d+ 1) · 2`M ≈ 16
Client sends: t∗ ≈ 2`M < 1
Server sends: t∗ ≈ `M < 1
SVM classification
(core) — Fig. 4
Server publishes: pkS,
{⦃θi⦄s}16i6d `M + (d+ 1) · 2`M ≈ 16
Client sends: t∗,
{⟦µi⟧}06i6`−1 2`M + ` · 2`M ≈ 56
Server sends:
{⟦h∗i ⟧}−16i6`−1 (`+ 1) · 2`M ≈ 56
SVM classification
(heuristic) — Fig. 5
Client sends: pkC ,
{⟦xi⟧}16i6d `M + d · 2`M ≈ 15
Server sends: t∗ 2`M < 1
FFNN
(generic) — Fig. 7
Server sends‡:
L · d · 2`M 45
t
(l)
j (15 per layer)
Client sends‡:
L · d · 2`M 45⟦x(l)j ⟧ (15 per layer)
FFNN sign act.
(core) — Fig. 8a
Server sends‡:
L · d · (`+ 1) · 2`M 5, 040
t∗,
{⦃µi⦄s}06i6`−1 (1, 680 per layer)
Client sends‡:
L · d · (`+ 2) · 2`M 5, 085⟦yˆ∗⟧, {⦃h∗i ⦄s}−16i6`−1 (1, 695 per layer)
FFNN sign act.
(heuristic) — Fig. 8b
Server sends‡:
L · d · 2`M 45
t∗ (15 per layer)
Client sends‡:
L · d · 2`M 45⟦yˆ∗⟧ (15 per layer)
FFNN ReLU act.
(core) — Fig. 9a
Server sends‡:
L · d · (`+ 1) · 2`M 5, 040
t∗,
{⦃µi⦄s}06i6`−1 (1, 680 per layer)
Client sends‡:
L · d · (`+ 4) · 2`M 5, 175⟦b⟧, z, {⦃h∗i ⦄s}−16i6`−1 (1, 725 per layer)
FFNN ReLU act.
(heuristic) — Fig. 9b
Server sends‡:
L · d · 2`M 45
t∗ (15 per layer)
Client sends‡:
L · d · 3 · 2`M 135⟦b⟧, z (45 per layer)
‡ Per unit, for each layer l (1 6 l 6 L).
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